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ABSTRACT. Philosophic contingency embedded in James Joyce’s avant-garde novel, ranging 
from Aristotelian notion of mimesis to the possibility of a Marxian reading, stemming from Hegel’s 
dialectic, added to the linguistic pragmatics, pave the way to focus on the process of realization and 
mental performance by a leading contemporary philosopher of analytic philosophy, J.L. Austin, as 
an epistemological triggering in the course of implication through a narrative, here Proteus, 
teleologically speaking, resulting a meta-utterance in a broader scale, much far from constative 
type, a metaphorical narration, elaborating on cultural agency, while paraphrasing the language-
based relativity of collective identity and complexity of Austin’s speech act theory, in terms of 
(in)felicitous conditions, rooted in the success of the communicative intention of the narrator, here 
Stephen Dedalus, maybe the most wonderful advanced guard of narratology in interior monologue.  
 
BLOOM  
(Placing his right hand on his testicles, swears). 
 So may the Creator deal with me.  
All this ‘I promise’ to do.  
(James Joyce, Ulysses) 
1. Introduction 
A leading figure in analytic philosophy, John Langshaw Austin (1911-1960), believes that 
Bloom in “all this I promise to do” (Joyce Ulysses 482) is not uttering evaluativley nor 
descriptively, but just acting. Those meanings that have truth values and express propositions are 
evaluative. Descriptive utterances are cognitive since they have truth values, whereas evaluative 
ones are non-cognitive which means they express attitudes.  This distinction is not new. What 
Austin brought us is that ‘I promise’, and a good many deal of other utterances like this, in the 
ordinary language, are not a part of the former nor the latter. By attacking this division, Austin 
pushes philosophy, into a new realm of developing a meticulous reevaluation of non-philosophical 
language, to shed more light on the distinctions we have, in our cut-and-dried life. 
2. Austin, Russell, Wittgenstein 
Ordinary life has its ordinary language toward which, there are two different philosophical 
attitudes. On one hand, Austin believes that this inherited language that we use in our life is in most 
areas a sophisticated and totally complex and subtle instrument that can help us clarify 
philosophical notions, by putting itself under close scrutiny, and on the other hand, Russell 
maintains that philosophy draws its problems from natural science, that its task is the analysis and 
explanation of the principals and concepts of natural science, and that the essence of philosophy is 
logic, the logical analysis of language (Rosenthal Russell) (Landini 147-188), and Wittgenstein- 
when writing his Tractus Logico-Philosophicus
1i
(1922)- insisted on the opposite, that ordinary 
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language “was the mere primitive, confused and confusing surface beneath which theorists were to 
seek the proper forms of both language and logic” (Craig 759). 
3. Speech Act Theory 
What we typically perform, as we speak, is the focus of Austin’s theory of speech acts. 
Introducing the word ‘performative’, Austin tries to review the whole history of philosophy to 
remind us, what is usual is to find out whether any utterance is true or false, or what he calls 
‘constatives’.  Utterances that are not truth-evaluable are performative utterances. Those which are 
in order- nothing is wrong with them, are felicitous and those with which something is wrong are 
infelicitous. As a performative is uttered, something is done, the locution. Hence, a locutionary act 
is saying something meaningful, whereas saying something meaningful for some purpose is an 
illocutionary act. Perlocutionary acts have an effect on those who hear what is said. Austin is much 
more meticulous than others when encountering “things like imperatives, the expression of wishes 
and exclamations”, till he castigates logical positivism for defaming the taxonomical framework of 
non-referential utterances. Taking “statements, reports or descriptions” as referential ones, he seeks 
to go beyond what is usual and remove the label of “nonsense” from those still not classified by 
philosophers. Touching literature, Austin quotes the first line of an untitled poem (1633) by John 
Donne, Go and Catch a Falling Star, to clarify that “considerations of this kind apply to any 
utterance at all, not merely to performatives” (Austin Philosophical 233-241).  
4. Bit of a Marxian Fever 
The objectivity of the outlook of Mirsky in 1933 when he wrote “Joyce is the literary 
representative of the Irish petty bourgeoisie” (Mirsky 31) can be traced back to 1917 when New 
Age published an unsigned review in July 12
th 
, 
…he [Joyce] fears to suffer, and will not therefore, put himself in the place of his 
hero; he will record with wonderful fidelity, and frequently with remarkable 
dramatic skill, what happened around or to Stephen Dedalus, but as it is all 
objectively viewed and objectively rendered, the character has no continuum, no 
personality” (254). 
Proteus, the third chapter of Ulysses, elaborates on Stephen, endlessly moving between the twin 
poles of objectivity and subjectivity. What is rendered through his thoughts, mingles with what he is 
seeing with by material body, which is also feared to be seen as an object, “who watches me here?”; 
“Can’t see! Who’s behind me?” (Joyce Ulysses 48). Shape shifting from a speculator to a spectator, 
it seems as if subject and object are the same- specre is the Latin root for ‘see, look’.  
Going back into history of a word, very often into Latin we come back pretty 
commonly to pictures or models of how things happen or are done. These models 
maybe fairly sophisticated and recent, as is perhaps the case with ‘motive’ or 
‘impulse’ but one of the commonest and most primitive types of model is one 
which is apt to baffle us through its vey naturalness and simplicity (Austin Plea 
29). 
The main standpoint, one can find the object-subject relation, is Materialism against Idealism. The 
union of the object and subject in materialism never ends to their being identical. Whether natural 
or societal, the existence of the object is prior to its subject, wholly independent; the inner life of 
Stephen, Stephen vis-à-vis cockle pickers, Cock Lake and so on. Stephen’s eyes are open, not yet 
closed. “Ineluctable modality of the visible” and, out there, what are they?  
The main point is not, that they are, but what they are, and whether or not their 
content is true. It does no good to the things to say merely that they have being. 
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What has being, will also cease to be when time creeps over it. It might also be 
alleged that subjective idealism tended to promote self−conceit. But surely if a 
man's world be the sum of his sensible perceptions, he has no reason to be vain of 
such a world. Laying aside therefore as unimportant this distinction between 
subjective and objective, we are chiefly interested in knowing what a thing is: i.e. 
its content, which is no more objective than it is subjective (Hegel 43). 
Idealist philosophy holds that reality and reason are the same (Craig Hegel). The identicality of the 
subject and object against their separate existences makes Stephen close his eyes to start his 
experiment “shut your eyes and see”. The process is Aristotelian, though. Stephen finds the material 
world or space as “what you damn well have to see” (Joyce Ulysses 186). Marxianly speaking, “We 
are all situated historically and socially, and our historical and social contexts “determine” or shape 
our lives. This is true of literature as it is true of human beings…” (Rivkin and Ryan 234). Thought 
and sight in accordance with mind act together to create the Aristotelian phase of the vision. Is 
Stephen seeing or is he seen? How is he ‘mediating’ to clarify an exact justification of whereabouts 
of his speculation through the process of seeing or being seen? It is not the single effect of interior 
monologue as a technique which does give us the answer to these questions. The apparition of a 
vague philosophical personality, is the least, and just an initiative outcome of a fair reading, which 
is failed by the nameless writer of the New Age. The continuum he is looking for is the somersault 
Stephen is experiencing, between flux and fixity, space and time, actuality and imagination 
(Johnson 782). 
Bourgeois decadence is the starting point from which various Marxian nuances evolved Joyce-wise, 
initiating critics like Radek who called Joyce “the hero of contemporary bourgeois literature” 
(Radek 2) then, Miller-Budnitskaya’s “the psychology of the average man”, resulting T. Farrell to 
ask: “Is a Marxist warranted in judging from so philistine a viewpoint…?” (Farrell 98). 
5. Propositional Content 
Austin maintains that not every time the verb ‘promise’ is used we are uttering a 
performative. Consider a Communist on Joyce: “Joyce acquires social significance. He promises 
[emphasis added] his audience that he will lead them to the depth that they long to fathom, but he 
excludes those things the penetration of which might lead to the revolution” (Gertsfelde 3). “Sie 
wissen das nicht, aber sie tun es
2ii”. 
According to Austin, when we say, ‘he promises’ we are reporting somebody’s ‘I promise’, 
therefore, ‘I promise’ is a performative since the action of performing a promise, is present in it; 
note the usage of first person singular present indicative active, but when the tense is shifted 
backwards like ‘I promised that…’, again, we are reporting not performing. The Marxian critic is 
attaching a report to Joyce that he does so and so. Bloom with hand on his testicles, utters a 
performative force not a report. “Let us distinguish between acting intentionally and acting 
deliberately or on purpose, as far as this can be done by attending to what language can teach us” 
(Austin Philosophical 273). György Lukács, Hungarian Marxist philosopher, aesthetician, literary 
historian, and critic defines the novel as “the epic of a world that has been abandoned by God” 
(Lukács Theory 23); Abram’s reading elaborates on bourgeois epic as “all novels that reflect the 
social reality of their capitalist age on a broad scale… [Emphasis added] (Abrams 78). Cristopher 
Bode’s concept of the ‘core business’ of the novel, is not far from Lukács’s ‘totality of being’, since 
he writes “the novel’s core business has always been to offer and display “possibilities of the 
generation and construction of meaning” (Bode 256). The heavy reliance of individual utterances on 
“background conditions” was discussed by Ferdinand de Saussure and Wittgenstein. The latter also 
claimed for the necessity of meaning to be described, to “place narrative as a socially symbolic act” 
(Moslemi 49). The linguistic proximity of the schemata Joyce prepared for Proteus and Proteus 
itself call for the “background” defamiliarization of philology, as the science focused by Joyce, to 
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utter a narrative, which in a broader scale, is illocutionary; moreover, a metamorphosis is undergone 
as soon as the hiatus of a perlocutionary force is aptly filled as Austin elaborates 
that any utterance which is performative could be reduced or expanded or 
analyzed into one of these two standard forms; beginning ‘I…’ so and so, or 
beginning ‘You (or he) hereby…’ so and so. If there was any justification for this 
hope to make a list of all the verbs which can appear in these standard forms and 
then we might classify the kind of acts that can be performed by performative 
utterances (Austin Philosophical 234). 
6. Double Explicit Performatory 
Stephen’s “shut your eyes and see” (Joyce Ulysses 37) is classified by Austin as ‘explicit 
performative’ whereas a primary performative utterance lacks the consent “whether we are ordering 
you or entreating you or, one another of many other subtly different acts which, in sophisticated 
primitive language, are very likely not yet discriminated. Never does Jakob Boheme mean to place 
Signatura Rerum
3
 before “I am here to read” to suggest that the world exists prior to Stephen. 
‘Here’, compared to Austin’s ‘hereby’ before the imperative “shut your…” makes, a double explicit 
performative. The immediacy covert in the construction of a state in which, no sooner than the 
reader, who is also the perceiver in context, is ordered to shut his/her eyes, “and see”, again, handles 
another performatory. Taking “here” as Austin’s “hereby”, added to the distinction Austin makes 
between “I order you to shut the door” and “Shut the door”, we clearly see Joyce is creating a 
narrative in which, Stephen is performing a performative, so subtle that at first glance, the only 
rationalization would suggest a poetical escape from simple prose, which Austin fears us to “over-
estimate the unsophistication of (its) primitive language” instead, paying close attention to “the tone 
of voice, cadence, gesture” in order to find “the nature of the circumstance”, and then “the context” 
in which the utterance is issued. Since a poetical escape is not rendered as a non-figurative 
reference to define a particular narrative, it is suggested that a “precise grammatical and lexical 
criteria” would suffice, but the truth is, that “it over simplifies the literary problems by carrying too 
far the correspondence between spoken discourse and silent thought. Speech is by definition always 
verbal, but thought is a matter of dispute, concerning consciousness, called “other mind stuff” by 
William James, it can be narrated directly or indirectly, but not quoted (Cohn 10). What Austin does 
is to undermine positivists’ model of knowledge, to clarify explicitly claims about the world, and 
the social relations that we find in the ordinary language, not a purified one. Therefore, Stephen is 
not quoting his thought, he is perceiving world, contemplating through Aristotle, the inescapability 
of the material world, as Žižek puts it: “…the task of philosophy is not to put answers, but to show 
how the way we perceive a problem can be itself part of the problem (Žižek 1:07), and, in 
particular, that aspect of it which is perceptible through the sense of sight. 
7. Rere Regardant 
From “ the inescapable nature of that which can be seen”, in the opening, we get to the final 
“rere regardant” (Joyce Ulysses 51), which is a felicitous gesture of Viconian looking backwards, 
while an actual stuttering of the tongue fulfills the linguistic felicity of the performative in the 
broader scale. The whole narrative, generally, portrays the infelicity of Stephen’s voice, trapped in 
Dublin, as Proteus trapped and fixated by Menelaus. Proteus is telling everything- in the Homeric 
level- because unhappily he is betrayed by his daughter … (Johnson 782-3).What Stephen typically 
performs as he speaks-the focus of Austin’s theory of speech act, to put it by Vico, is to stutter, both 
in speaking and in thinking, or even finally in expression, “rere regardant”. As a presupposition of a 
forward to “Bygmester Finnegan, of the Stuttering Hand’ (Joyce Finnegans Wake 4),as an 
exordium to a voice yet not discovered, or to put it in a broader scale,as an exordium to a new 
discourse. The social taxonomical status of Ulysses, the so-called bourgeois categorization, 
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alienation in its Marxian term, écriture féminine, Kristeva’s reading of Bakhtin (Kristeva 37), and 
even McHale’s outstanding Coda on Joyce’s endings, distinction between epistemological and 
ontological concerns of postmodern literature (McHale 233), all, might be able to be explained 
under Austin’s speech act theory, since they are deeply rooted in the epistemological nuances. 
“Rere Regardant” is the manifestation of an inner contradiction between Protean poles, floating 
from Homeric parallels to Dublin’s ‘tawdry townsmen’. The more Stephen tries to change the 
outcome of his perlocutionary force, the more struggle he beholds (in)felicitously, causing him seep 
deeper, down his gaze; moreover, we have his thought, as he stares, desiring to paraphrase his civic 
consciousness, trapped in a place for which he fights, contradictorily, both to live and depart. 
A place belongs to the one who has most deeply 
loved it, they said, has hoped in it beyond 
its self-corruption. The land, people, the city 
… 
He could not find 
a door to open. He did not know a soul (Moritz 119). 
8. Conclusion 
“Within the social construction of selfhood “man gladly accepts as his authority Hegel’s ideaiii 
according to which the citizen acquires his ethical dignity in transcending himself towards the 
universal, but as a primitive individual he has a right to desire and pleasure” (Beavoir second 646). 
The kernel of this philosophy which is taken to be “innocent and child-like fancies” (Marx and 
Engels 1), is a “purely metaphysical construct” (Lukács History xxiii) rooted in consciousness. 
“The Absolute is infinite life, and love is the consciousness of the unity of this life, of unity with the 
infinite life itself and of unity with other men through this life” (Copleston 164). Although Stephen 
is mediating on Aristotle, he cannot accept the Eleatic School, “that the world was fundamentally 
unknowable by humans” (Woodfin and Groves 30); he wants to know it; hence, his question, which 
Heidegger calls the “piety of the question”iv, back and forth displaced in itself/ by itself, comes 
before the displaced constative, manages to get to “the performativity of the event”, turns the 
question into an ontological (Woolfreys 250). 
i
 “In this aphoristic and difficult book he presents the view that the only meaningful use of language 
is a picture of empirical, scientific fact; otherwise language will be tautological, as in logic and 
mathematics, or nonsensical as, in metaphysics and judgments of value” (Drabble Wittgenstein). 
ii ‘Ideology’ (Marx 88). 
iii
 Phenomenology of Sprit (1807) advanced the notion that selfhood is socially constructed; civic 
consciousness is a stage on the route to full self-consciousness.  
iv For a rigorous complication of Heidegger’s question, see Derrida’s Of Spirit... 
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